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Life .. Functional Theories of Life 
Fred Feldman 
Introductory Comments 
On a beauciful fall day in 1990, my wife, my daughter, and I went for a 
walk on a very pretty hill near our home. As we were coming down the 
hill, I noticed a garter snake by the side of the path. I pointed this out to 
my wife and daughter. The snake was quite motionless. My daughter 
asked, 'is it alive?' I nudged the snake with the toe of my shoe. It did nor 
move. I suspect that it was dead. 
Imagine a scene at NASA headquarcers. Suppose some TV images are 
bei.ng received from the Viking Lander which has landed on Mars. 
Suppose that a blurry object is seen in certain of the piccures. The object 
looks something like a colony of lichen or fungus growing on some rocks. 
On the other hand, it might just be some dust. or perhaps a discoloration 
on the surface of the rocks. The NASA engineers are fasc inated. One asks, 
'Do you think it might be alive?' Another answers, 'No, that's not alive. It's 
just a patch of mineral discoloration on the surface of those rocks. There 
are similar rocks on earth.' 
Imagine a trip to Disneyland. A small child is amazed by a roaring, 
tooth,gnashing, lifelike robot dinosaur. He fears that it might be real. He 
asks his parents whether the dinosaur is alive. They assure him that it is 
only a machine. It is not alive. 
Imagine a high school biology class. A cold, limp frog lies on the lab 
table. The students gather around. The instructor attaches two wires to 
the frog. The other ends of the wires are attached to small battery. When a 
switch is closed, the frog twitches. The students are startled and some 
jump back. One student asks whether the frog is alive. The instructor 
explains that the frog is not alive, but electrical stimulation of the nerves 
in the big leg muscles still make the muscles contract. That's why the frog 
moved. 
In all these cases, and in countless others relevantly like them, someone 
uses the word 'alive'. When they ask these questions, or make these 
assertions, the speakers presumably take themselves to understand what 
they have said. Others - the ones who hear their questions or statements 
- presumably also take themselves to understand what has been asked or 
said. They think they understand what the word 'alive' means. 
Of course, if we look at the matter from a certain perspective, the 
presumption is true enough. We all know how to use the word 'alive', and 
we all have some vague grasp of some of the ways in which living things 
2
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 23 [1992], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol23/iss1/2
66 Fred Feldman 
commonJy differ from nonliving ones. However, if we look at the matter 
from another perspective, I think we have to conclude that we don't know 
what 'alive' means. More exactly, my point is that none of us can give a 
clear and precise account of what the word 'alive' means. Strictly, then, I 
chink we do not know precisely what we mean when we ask whether 
something is alive, or when we say that something is alive. I chink none of 
us has grasped the concept of life explicitly. 
Many philosophers and biologists have attempted to explain what 'alive' 
means. I will not attempt in this paper to discuss all the views that have 
been proposed. There are too many of them. Instead, I will focus on a few 
members of one influential family of such accounts. These accounts have 
this in common: in each case, it is alleged that we can explain what we 
mean when we say that something is alive by mentioning something about 
some so,called "life functions." Thus, I will be discussing some life, 
functional 1explanations of life. 
A Distinction 
In order to make my topic clearer, I should distinguish it from another 
topic with which it may easily be confused. There is, on the one hand, an 
empirical, scientific question about the common properties distinctive of 
actual living organisms here on earth. To find the answer to this question, 
one would have to identify all the main kinds of living things on earth, and 
one would have to examine them closely to discover whether there is in 
fact some feature they all share. One would then have to consider whether 
these features are distinctive of living things. In other words, one would 
have to determine that only living things have the common features. 
Suppose some microbiologist discovered that all and only actual living 
things on earth have certain microbiological features X, Y, and Z. She 
could then say that all and only living things here on earth have features 
X, Y, and z. That might answer this biological question. But note that 
such a claim would at best be contingent. No matter what X, Y, and Z might 
be, even the microbiologist would admit that it is still possible that there 
might be living things elsewhere that lack X, Y, and Z. The microbiologist 
surely would also admit that if life on earth had evolved in some other way, 
living things here might have lacked X, Y,  and Z. So the answer co this first 
question is at best empirical, contingent, and restricted to "life as we know 
. " lt . 
I mean to be discussing a much more fundamental question. My 
question is not a question in biology, to be answered by careful study of 
actual living things here on earth. My question is a question about the 
concept of life itself. It is a philosophical question, rather than a biological 
one. A satisfactory answer to my question would not be contingent or 
empirical. It would be a necessary truth, telling us something about the 
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concepc of life icself. Those raised in the analytic tradition mighc hope that 
the answer co this question would appear in the fonn of a philosophical 
analysis of the concepc of life, or a definition of 'x is alive ac t '. Of course, it 
is noc essential chac the answer should cake precisely this form. It is the 
concenc of the answer, not the form, chac macters. 
Suppose we decide in the end 'alive' means 'has features A, B. and C. If 
chis accounc of the meaning of 'alive' is correct, then not only on earth, 
but everywhere in the universe. chings chac are alive must have features A. 
B, and C. Funhermore, if the account is correct. then there is no conceiv, 
able way in which evolution could have progressed in which living things 
would have lacked A. B, and C. This is not shocking. For, if the account of 
meaning is correct, chen, when we say that these things would have been 
alive, all we mean is that they would have had features A, B, and C. 
Obviously, then, there couldn't be a living thing without the specified 
features. 
So my question will not be answered by some contingent, empirical 
stacement about living things as we know them. It will be answered by a 
necessary, conceptual statement about living things. of whatever possible 
sort. 
Wfiy Ask This Question? 
There are several independent reasons for taking this question seriously. 
One of these concerns the status of biology as a unitary science. Tradition, 
ally, biology has been defined as the science of life. The main thing that 
ties all branches of biology together is that they are all various ways of 
studying living things. If it should tum out that living things have nothing 
in common, then biology would lose its claim to be a single science. 
· 
A second reason to enquire into the nature of life itself is prompted by 
recent interest in exobiology. When NASA designed a space probe to 
search for life on other planets, they did not design the probe merely to 
react to "life as we know it". The probe had to be designed in such a way as 
to recognize life even in forms quite different from those with which we are 
familiar here on earth. NASA engineers obviously recognized that life itself 
is not restricted to the earthly forms. Living things might appear in all sorts 
of forms - some might even be so bizarre that no one at NASA could 
anticipate their details. 
I can imagine some NASA engineers puzzled about their project. 11We 
want to design a probe that will react to life in whatever form it might 
take. We can't anticipate the details of all possible forms. So what are we 
looking for? What do we mean when we say we are looking for life?" Thus, 
an interest in exobiology might provoke an interest in our philosophical 
question. 
A third possible reason to be interested in life is a moral reason. Some 
4
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 23 [1992], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol23/iss1/2
68 Fred Feldman 
chink that there is a moral reason to respect life; that living things have a 
special sort of value. Surely it would be mere planetary chauvinism to 
accord this value only to life as we know it on earth. Ef life itself is valuable, 
then life of all sorts - even sorts we cannot imagine - is valuable. So if 
we chink that life itself is valuable, we may want to enquire into the nature 
of life. If we don't know what life itself is, then this moral doctrine is to a 
certain extent empty. We say that living things are valuable, but we don't 
know precisely which things we are thereby praising. 
My own view is that the enquiry into the nature of life needs no 
justification. Philosophers enquire into the nature of knowledge, causation, 
beauty, obligation, justice, etc. Since the concept of life is at least as 
interesting and important as these other concepts, it is appropriate that 
philosophers seek to understand it, too. The search need not be premised 
on some pragmatic payoff. Of course, if there is a further, pragmatic 
justification for our enquiry, then so much the better. My point is that the 
enquiry needs no such justification. Like all serious philosophy, it is 
intrinsically worthwhile. 
In any case, let us turn to some proposed answers to our question about 
the nature of life. 
Ufe Functionalism 
If you turn to the first chapter of a typical high school or college biology 
textbook, you will almost certainly find a discussion of our question. And 
in virtually every case, the question will be answered by appeal to a list of 
"life functions". So, for example, in Chapter One of my younger daughter's 
10th grade biology textbook1, we find a list mentioning these life functions: 
1 .  Nutrition , converting materials from the environment into forms the 
organism can use. 
2. Transport , moving usable materials from one part of the organism to 
another. 
3. Respiration , releasing chemical energy from nutrients. 
4. Synthesis and assimilation , combining simple substances so as to make 
more complex ones. 
5. Growth , increasing in size. 
6. Excretion , getting rid of wastes. 
7. Regulation , maintaining a stable internal environment. 
8. Reproduction , producing new organisms. 
9. Metabolism , seems to be a combination of 1 ,  3, 4. 
In the first chapter of my older daughter's college level textbook, we 
find a significantly different list. In answer to the question, 'what charac­
teristics do all living things have in common?', the authors of that book say: 
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. . . all are chemically complex and highly organized. All 
use energy (metabolize) .  organize themselves (develop), 
and reproduce. All change (e\'olve) over generations. So 
far as we know. no nonli\·ing thing possesses all these 
attributes. In addition. and perhaps most important, only 
the living organism has a set of instructions, or "pro, 
gram'' resident in its genes, that directs its metabolism, 
organization, and reproduction, and is the raw material 
upon which evolution acts.� 
In Ernst Mayr's The Growth of Biological Thought, there is a section 
entitled "Special Characcerisrics of Living Organisms. "3 Mayr asserts that 
'the process of living can be defined.' He proceeds to mention a number of 
characteristics that, according to him, 'are not or not in the same manner 
found in inanimate objects.' His list includes the following items: 
I .  Complexity and organization. 
2. Chemical uniqueness , che chemical characteristics of living things are 
different from chose of nonliving things. 
3. Quality , living things have properties, and stand in relations that 'can 
be expressed, in most cases, only qualitatively, not quantitatively."4 
4 . .  Uniqueness and variability , no two living things are exacdy alike; each 
one changes through time. 
5. Possession of genetic program , 'All organisms possess a historically 
evolved genetic program, coded in the DNA of the nucleus of the 
zygote (or in RNA in some viruses).5 
6. Historical nature , species are organized by common descent, rather 
than by similarity. 
7. Natural selection , has no exact equivalent among processes of change 
in the inanimate world.6 
8. Indeterminacy , living things often display emergent characteristics, 
that could not have been predicted on the basis of their previous states. 
I find a certain feature of these three lists astonishing. In order to make 
this feature more obvious, I have constructed a chart that presents a 
condensed formulation of the information contained in the lists. In the 
chart, 'S&S' indicates Schraer and Stoltze, 'K&G' indicates Keeton and 
Gould. An 'x' indicates that the author mentioned at the top of the 
column claims that the life function at the left of the row is partially 
definitive of life. 
6
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Even this very brief glimpse of just three respectable texts in biology should 
make one fact clear. Modern life, functionalists are in wild disagreement 
about which properties are the life functions. Schraer and Stoltze agree 
with Keeton and Gould on two items; they disagree on eleven. The list 
provided by Mayr contains eight items. Not one of these appears in the 
Schraer and Stouze list. Only three appear in the Keeton and Gould list. 
Another puzzling feature of these lists is this: each of the authors cited 
suggests in some passages that each of the relevant life functions is 
necessary for life, and that they are jointly sufficient. However, each of the 
authors also remarks that there are borderline cases, and that ther1e are 
exceptions. So, it is not clear that any of these authors was in fact attempt, 
ing to answer our question. Indeed, in light of the remarks about 
exceptions and borderline cases, it is not entirely clear what question they 
were trying to answer. 
Perhaps it would be a good idea, then, to begin at the beginning. Let us 
start by considering one of the oldest and most distinguished versions of 
the life functional approach. This is the version presented by a man who 
was both the first great biologist and one of the first great philosophers -
Aristotle. 
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Alrhough different texts suggest different lists. Aristotle seems w have 
recognued the following main life functions: 
l .  Nutrition: the capacity co get food. absorb it into oneself. and 
thereby to grow. Surprisingly. Aristotle maintain:s that nutrition is insepa­
rable from reproduction; that these are both functions of the same "soul" 
- the nutritive soul. 'Nutrition and reproduction are due co one and the 
same psychic power.'; Reproduction is the capacity ro produce offspring. 
Aristotle maintains that the capacity co engage in nutrition is the most 
basic and widely distributed life function.:- His view seems to be that every 
living thing, plane or animal, has chis capacity; no nonliving thing has it. 
Thus, apparently according to Aristotle, a thing is alive if and only if it can 
engage in nutrition and reproduction. 
z. Sensation: An organism has sense if it is capable of 'rec�iving into 
itself the sensible fonns of things without . . .  .' 9  This capacity operates in two 
different modes. Certain senses (couch and taste) operate on objects that 
are in contact with the organism. Aristotle seems to have believed that all 
animals have che capacity co engage in chis "immediate sensa!fion" . 10 
Plants, however, do not have it. The second mode of sensation involves 
the perception of objects that are not in direct contact with tlhe organism. 
Sight, smell, and hearing are che instances of chis mediate form of sensa­
tion. Aristotle claims' 1 that these senses are not found in every sort of 
animal, but only in animals char can move. He apparently felc that chert: 
would be no point in giving sight, for example, to a fixed animal such as a 
barnacle. After all, even if che barnacle could see a casry bit of food a few 
inches away, it would not be able to do anything about it. Having sight 
would not improve the well,being of a barnacle. Hence, nature did not 
give barnacles eyes.12 
3. Morion: An organism has "che locomotive soul" provided that it is 
capable of movirng itself from place tO place. Aristotle apparently held that 
the locomotive soul is always found in conjunction with the far sensitive 
soul. 1 3  Stripped of its soulful terminology, the claim amounts w chis: a 
creature can move itself about if and only if it can see, hear, or smell. 
4. Thought: some organisms are able co think. This includes people, 
and perhaps some other rational beings. (Aristotle says1� that this sort of 
"rational soul" is 'capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic 
powers.' Perhaps he is chinking of gods. There seems co be a slight tension 
between this remark and his later remark that 'the nutritive soul then must 
be possessed by everything that is alive .. . ' 1 5  Perhaps he means to say this: 
among mortal beings, the nutritive soul is universal. If we include immortal 
beings, we find instances of things with rational souls but without nutritive 
souls.) 
Aristotle maintains that 'of the psychic powers above enumerated, some 
kinds of living things, as we said, possess all, some less than all, others one 
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only.'16 If we simplify slightly, and emphasize certain texts rather than 
others, we can present the outlines of Aristtotle's view in a chart. 1; 
Plants Fixed Animals Beasts People 
Nutrition Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reproduction Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* 
Near Sensation No Yes Yes Yes 
Far Sensation No No Yes Yes 
Motion No No Yes Yes 
Thought No No No Yes 
A few comments may be in order. First, it is imrx>rtanc to recognize that 
Aristotle views nutrition and reproduction as functions of the same "soul" 
- the nutritive. Furthermore, he explicitly acknowledges18 that there are 
many cases in which individual plants and animals are incapable of 
engaging in reproduction. Thus, I have asterisked the 'yes' in each occur­
rence concerning reproduction. 
While the chart is surely suggestive, it does not yet constitute an answer 
to our fundamental question: 'What is Life ?' One natural answer, based on 
these Aristotelian ideas, would be this: 
lF l :  x is alive at t =df. x is able to perform at least one of the 
life functions at t. 
It seems to me, however, that there are very serious problems for LF l .  One 
of these problems concerns motion. If we understand motion in a straight­
forward manner, we will have to say that any mechanical device that is 
capable of setting itself into motion displays this sort of life function. As a 
result, LF l seems to imply that natural objects such as tornadoes and 
volcanos, as well as artifacts such as alarm clocks, robots of various sorts, 
automatic lawn sprinkling devices, etc. are all alive. 
Reproduction raises some interesting puzzles, too. Consider a dead 
tomato plant hanging forlornly in the frozen garden of some careless 
gardener who forgot to clean up after the fall frosts. That plant surely is 
not alive. Yet, there are seeds in the shriveled tomatoes. When spring 
comes, those seeds may germinate, giving rise to a whole flock of baby 
tomato plants. My question is this: is the tomato plant capable of perform, 
ing the life function called 'reproduction'? If so, then LF 1 implies that it is 
still alive. If not, then how can this be squared with the fact that it still has 
the capacity to produce a flock of seedlings in the spring? 
Aristotle himself seems to have been particularly impressed by the 
apparent universality of the nutritive soul. In a widely quoted passage, he 
says: 
9
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This I the power of self-nutririon] is the originative 
power the possession of which leads us to speak of things 
as litiing ar all... 1Q 
And in another just a few paragraphs later we find: 
. . .  first o( all we must treat of nutrition and reproduction, 
for the nmritive soul i found along with all the others 
and is the most primirive and widely disrrihured power 
of soul, being indeed char one in virrue of which all are 
said to have life. The acts in which it manifests itself are 
reproduction and the use of food . . . z\I 
On one interpretation, Arisrotle might be taken co be maintaining thi!' 
view about life itself: 
LFZ: x is alive at t =df. x is able to engage in nucrition and 
reproduction at t. 
Obviously, however, this won't do. As Aristotle himself pointed out, very 
many living things cannot engage in reproducrion.21 He cites rlhree sons of 
cases in which living things lack the capacity co reproduce. Some cannot 
reproduce because they are too young. (I suppose we could add char some 
cannot reproduce because they are too old.) He goes on to mention 
organisms that ar,e "mutilated". Finally, he mentions organisms whose 
mode of reproduction is spontaneous. Aristotle seems to have thought that 
some creatures are produced by spontaneous generation, and don't have to 
bother with reproduction. Be this as it may, the first two points are surely 
conclusive. Lots of things cannot engage in reproduction even though they 
are alive. Thus, LF2 is clearly wrong. 
We could modify LFZ merely by deleting the second conjunct. This 
would yield: 
LF3: x is alive at t =df. x is able to engage in nutrition at t. 
Aristotle devotes several pages to his discussion of nutrition. He 
presents a fascinating discussion of the analysis of the concept of "food", 
and he talks about the nature of growth. In the end, however, stripped of 
complexities, his view seems to be this: a creature can engage in nutrition 
at a time if and only if it is able at that time to acquire some food, absorb 
that food and make it part of itself, and as a result, grow and have the 
energy needed to do what needs co be done. 
By way of criticism of LF3, I here quote at length a moving passage fTom 
The Nature of living Things by C. Brooke Worth and Robert K. Enders. 
10
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Worth and Ender have been describing an experimenc with a cecrop1a 
moch. Shortly after the moth emerged from irs pupal shell, Worth and 
Enders tied a rring around its waist and placed it outdo r where a male 
could find it. According ro their account. a male did find the much: 
Copulation lasts through the day. In the evening we 
untether the female and put her in a shoe box for an 
hour or so. By this time she has laid fifty eggs, So we let 
her go. For the next few nights she will doc the rest of 
her eggs, some two or three hundred, on various trees. 
What then? Already her gorgeous wings are a bit 
tattered. Her abdomen has shrunk and she is beginning 
to tremble. But naturally! She has been so busy that food 
has been forgotten. Now she is faced with tragedy 
greater than one would suspect, for her entire race has 
forgotten about food. The caterpillar's digestive tract, 
taken to bed in the pupa's interior, was completely 
demolished during moth,formation, but no substitute 
was provided. So here flits the cecropia, completely 
absolved of her responsibilities to posterity, but unable to 
taste the rewards of accomplishment. No mouth, no 
stomach - only a small additional reserve of stored 
energy. The moth flies about bright lights for a few 
evenings more but then falls ragged and quivering to the 
ground, where ants slowly extinguish the rest of its 
waning life.12 
The case of the cecropia moth demonstrates, I chink, that a creature 
can be alive at a time even though it is not then able to engage in nutri, 
tion. Other examples come to mind. While undergoing abdominal surgery, 
a person's digestive system might be temporarily detached and "shut 
down". Furthermore, the patient himself might be unconscious and 
paralyzed. Though the patient is clearly alive, he cannot acquire any food 
(because he's paralyzed and unconscious) and he cannot absorb any food 
(because his intestines are detached). As it stands, LF 3 is unsatisfactory. 
It should be obvious that we cannot modify LF3 in anything like this 
way: 
LF3': x is alive at t =df. either (i) x is able to engage in nutrition at t, or 
else (ii) x was able to engage in nutrition at some time earlier than t. 
The problem with LF3' is that nearly every dead organism satisfies the 
second disjunct of the definiens. Corpses are nonliving things that formerly 
were able to engage in nutrition. 
11
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l e  seems clear, then, that Anscocle's version of the life-functional 
approach suffers from some prett)' serious problems. Perhaps rwo thousand 
years of biological research has prm·ided the basis for a more plausible 
formulation. Let us therefore consider some t)'Pical modem examples of 
the life-functional approach co the analysis of the concept of lifo. 
In Philosophy: An lmroduccion to the Art of Wondering, James Christian says: 
At present, it appears that "life" can be defined with two 
qualities: self-replication and mutability. Any organism 
possessing these two qualities can be considered alive. In 
these two characteristics is conrained the essential 
processes of evolution: continuity and adaptation . ... But 
mutability - the ability co effect changes from one 
generation co another and adapt to a fluid environment 
- is essential. Without the ability to change and adapc 
no species could long survive. Environmental conditions 
are forever changing; species must be able to change 
along with their environments. So far as we know, only 
living organisms have these two qualities, and an 
organism must possess both qualities to be considered 
alive.23 
Since Christian is a philosopher, and not a biologist, it might seem that 
his views are not worthy of consideration here. Thus, it is interesting to 
compare Christian's view with a view presented in a college-level biology 
textbook written by my good friend, Richard Goldsby. Goldsby is a 
respected biologisc. Goldsby mentions che exobiologists at NASA and their 
reflections on the nature of life. Goldsby reports: 
These scientists have tried to reduce the functional 
definition of life to the most simple, general, and abstract 
criteria. Their conclusion is that only two characteristics 
distinguish living entities from inanimate nature: the 
ability to reproduce themselves, and the means of 
producing and perpetuating genetic variations among the 
offspring. 24 
Goldsby goes on to claim that this very abstract definition of life has 
certain corollaries. In order to reproduce, an organism has to stay alive at 
least for a little while. This requires metabolism (the ability to "absorb, 
transform, and use material from the environment") and adaptation (the 
12
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ability to make useful, genuinely "homeostatic" respon es co changes in the 
environment). Christian also mentions these other life functions=> along 
with a few others, but it isn't clear that he views them as "corollaries" of 
the core definition. 
Thus it appears that NASA (at least according to Goldsby) and 
Christian would agree that life itself can be defined as follows: 
LF4: x is alive at t =df. x is able to reproduce at t & x is able to 
produce and perpetuate genetic variation among offspring at c.  
The influence of Charles Darwin is obvious in this account of life. As 
both Christian and Goldsby point out, this analysis of the concept of life 
very naturally leads to the conclusion that Hving things will be able to 
evolve as their environment changes (so long as the environment changes 
at a suitable rate, and the mutations occur at a suitable rate). In virtue of 
this emphasis, this sort of analysis is sometimes called '"the genetic analysis 
of life". It is nowadays quite popular with philosophers and biologists. 
Neverthe·less it is clear that, as it stands, LF4 won't work. As we have 
already noted, lots of living things are unable to reproduce. In some cases, 
infertility is only temporary, but in other cases it is permanent and life, 
long. Among ants and bees, for example, many living individuals are 
permanently sterile. The same holds true for certain hybrids, such as 
mules. Obviously, if a thing can't produce offspring at all, then it surely 
cannot produce offspring manifesting genetic variations from itself. Thus, 
each conjuct of the the proposed analysis of life is clearly too narrow, and 
the analysis itself fails. 
Two .. tiered Views 
One natural modification of LF4 suggests itself. We must distinguish 
between the concrete, individual organism ("this particular mosquito , the 
one that just bit my ear") and the species (in this case, I suspect, Culex 
pipiens). Living individuals may be unable to reproduce. But, as a number 
of authors going back to Aristotle have remarked, a viable species must 
have some standard method (or methods) of reproduction. Typical adult, 
unmutilated instances of the species generally reproduce in the method 
standard for the species. 
In the case of variation, the focus on the species rather than the 
individual is even more obvious. It makes virtually no sense to say that an 
individual mosquito undergoes genetic variation from generation to 
generation. The individual has the same genetic makeup chroughou t its 
existence, and is a member of exactly one generation, no matter how long 
it lives. However, it does make sense to say that a species undergoes genetic 
variation from generation to generation. Roughly, what chis means is chat 
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individuals of one generation are genetically different from individuals of 
other generations. 
In order to simplify our discussion, let us introouce some convenient 
abbreviations. We can say that a species is reproductive just in case there is 
a methoo of reproouction such that typical members of that species 
reproouce by that method. Thus, the ameba is reproouctive because 
typical members undergo fission; the tomato is reproouctive because 
typical members produce viable seeds; the lion is reproouctive because 
males inseminate females who then carry their cubs to term; etc. Going 
beyond this, we can say that a species is variably reproductive just in case it 
is reproductive, and furthermore individuals of one generation are capable 
of producing offspring that manifest small genetic differences from their 
parents. We need not attempt to define what is meant by 'small' genetic 
differences. 
Making use of these abbreviations, and taking note of the distinction 
between species and individuals, we could replace LF4 with: 
LFS: x is alive at t =df. x is a member of some variably reproductive 
species at t. 
The advantage of LFS over LF4 is clear. Immature, "mutilated", and post, 
reproductive individuals are not counterexamples to LFS. Such individuals 
are counted as living, not because they can reproduce, but because they 
are members of reproductive species. Furthermore, sterile ants and bees 
also count as alive on LFS, since they are members of variably reproductive 
species. Their own sterility is here irrelevant. Unfortunately, a moment's 
reflection will reveal that LFScasts the net of life much too widely. It 
correctly counts the senile as alive; it incorrectly counts the deceased as 
alive. A dead chicken is still a chicken; it is still a member of a variably 
reproductive species. LFS therefore tells us that each such chicken is still 
alive. 
Someone might insist, as a sort of desperate defensive maneuver, that a 
dead chicken is really not a chicken. Such a person might claim that the 
corpse of a member of a species is not itself a member of that species. This 
seems to me to be wrong. If we reflect for a moment on the activities of 
taxonomists, its wrongheadedness will become even clearer. The typical 
entomological taxonomist, for example, does virtually all of her work with 
dead specimens. She sorts individuals into species - but the individuals 
are rarely living. She points to her cases of dead butterflies and says, 'This 
is the Monarch; that is the Viceroy. Notice the difference in the pattern.' 
If the current proposal were correct, the taxonomist would be wrong. 
Strictly speaking, there would be no Monarchs or Viceroys in her case. 
Only a dedicated philosopher could say such a thing with a straight face. 
This sort of approach gives rise to further profound difficulties. Perhaps 
the most intractable of these is this: LFS makes use of the notoriously 
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obscuie concept of "species". In order to make LF5 fully ansfactory as a 
phiLosophicaJ analysis of the concepr of life, we would have to give some 
account of the concept of species, and that would be a most difficult ta k.  
However, if we insist on altering our concept of species in such a way that, 
as a matter of conceptual necessity, each species contains only livmg 
members, then the task becomes vastly more diffic ulc. Furthermore, as 
should be pretty obvious, the task presupposes a solution to our present 
problem. En order to define 'species', we would have first co define 'alive'. 
Conclusion 
In spite of its magnificent pedigree and its popularity, it seems to me that 
the life functional approach to the analysis of life is unsuccessful. I see no 
satisfactory way to define life by appeal to some set of life functions. This 
leaves open some very baffling questions: precisely what is it that makes 
biology into one unified science? precisely what is it that life,seeking space 
probes are looking for on other planets? {for those who think that life is 
sacred) precisely what is ic that you think is sacred? 
The rest of us - who are neither exobiologists nor committed to the 
sacredness of life - srill confront this question: precisely what do you 
mean when you say that something is alive? Can you give a clear account 
of precisely what my daughter meant when she asked whether the garter 
snake was alive? My hunch is chat none of us can do it. 
Notes 
1 William 0. Schraer and Herbert J. Stoltze, Biology: The Study of 
Ufe, (Fairfield, NJ: Cebco Standard Publishing, 1983). The list 
presented here is a condensed version a list given by Schraer 
and Stoltze on pp. 5, 7. 
z William T. Keeton and James L. Gould, Biological Science, 4th 
ed., (New York: W.W., . Norton & Company, 1986), 2. 
3 Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought, (Cambridge, 
Ma.; The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982). 
53. 
4 Op. cit., 55 .. 
s 'b'd l I . 
6 Op. cit., 57. 
7 Aristotle, De Anima, 416al8. 
15
Feldman: Life-Functional Theories of Life
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1992
� Op . 4 l 3bl· 4 1 - I �  1 -. Cit., . )a-..>--). 
0 Op. cit., 424al7. 
I� Op. Cit., 434b}4. 
1 1 Op. cit., 434b25. 
Ufe-F1m �rional Theorie5 of Ufe 79 
12 Op. cit., Book III, Chapter 12 .  
1 3 "b"d l I . 
14 Op. cit., 4 l 3b26. 
15 Op. cit., 434a23. 
16 Op. cit., 4 1 4a28. 
11 This chart is derived from one presented by Thomas S. Hall in 
his Ideas of Life and Mauer, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1 969), Volume 1 ,  109. 
18 Aristotle, De Anima, 41 5a27. 
19 Op. cit., 4 l Jbl. 
20 Op. cit., 4 1 5a23-25. 
2 1 Op. cit., 4 1 5a28. 
12 C. Brooke Worth and Robert K. Enders, The Nature of Living 
Things, (New York: New American Library, 1955), 9 1 -92. 
23 James Christian, Philosophy: An Introduction to the An of 
Wondering, Fifth Edition (Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1 990), 373-4. 
24 Richard Goldsby, et. al., Biology, (New York: Harper and Row, 
1976), 2. 
25 James Christian, op. cit., 4 1 5. 
16
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 23 [1992], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol23/iss1/2
